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ABSTRACT 
The speed and means at which information is acquired, 
developed and utilized has changed substantially over the 
last two decades, as the Marine Corps has made the 
transition from their traditional means of situational 
awareness (SA) and common operational picture (COP) 
development through radio updates and map boards, to the 
advanced information system enabled graphical user interface 
(GUI) by means of Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and 
Below-Blue Force Tracker (FBCB2-BFT). The commander’s 
understanding of the situation formerly relied on the push-
pull of information between himself, his subordinates, 
higher, and adjacent units. Now, the commander and his 
subordinates share a near-real time enhanced flow of 
information. The introduction of FBCB2-BFT greatly improves 
the ability to obtain SA and knowledge at all levels.   
 This study examines the impact of FBCB2-BFT on tactical 
level command and control (C2) and decision making.  Via a 
survey, the researcher’s elicited opinions from 114 veterans 
of Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom about the effects 
of FBCB2-BFT on operational decision making and its impact 
in real world situations.  
 The survey results indicate that the categories of 
operation referenced (OEF/OIF) and Military Occupational 
Specialty (MOS) domain (Aviation/Ground) are statistically 
significant factors in influencing how FBCB2-BFT is used.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
Historically, Marine Corps battalions/squadrons1 
developed their situational awareness (SA) and common 
operational picture (COP) through voice communications, map 
boards and handheld global positioning systems (GPS). 
Commanders communicated with subordinate units through line-
of-sight (LOS) propagation radio transmissions and relays, 
and rarely did they reach more than one level down the chain 
of command. The commander’s understanding of any situation 
relied on the push-pull of information between himself, his 
subordinates, higher, and adjacent units. Conversely, 
company level units relied heavily on the battalion 
commander and his staff for information outside their 
immediate area. Due to the inherent uncertainty of battle 
(fog of war) and the limited range of radio communications, 
mission type orders were issued that clearly articulated the 
commander’s intent and allowed the subordinate leader to 
exercise his initiative within that intent. Once radio 
communications were lost, the leader charged with 
accomplishing the mission was forced to make decisions 
without conferring with higher headquarters and higher 
headquarters was left to assume that subordinates were 
executing the mission within their intent. Once 
                     
1 From this point forward, the word “battalion” will predominately be 
used in lieu of the term battalions/squadrons.  At the Marine Corps 
tactical level, battalions and squadrons are synonymous, with exception 
that battalions represent the ground component and squadrons represent 
the aviation component.  Variation does occur, but typically, these are 
units of 400-800 personnel and commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel. 
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communications were reestablished, any significant events 
that had occurred were conveyed to higher headquarters. The 
Marine Corps embraced this concept of command and control 
(C2) and, according to Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6 
(MCDP6) Command and Control,  
The Marine Corps’ concept of command and control 
is based on accepting uncertainty as an 
undeniable fact and being able to operate 
effectively despite it. The Marine Corps’ command 
and control system is thus built around mission 
command and control which allows us to create 
tempo, flexibility, and the ability to exploit 
opportunities but which also requires us to 
decentralize and rely on low-level initiative.  
The development and fielding of FBCB2-BFT significantly 
increased the level of SA for all users [U.S. and coalition 
service members], regardless of echelon of command. For 
example, Marine Corps battalion commanders can now not only 
view the individual battlespace locations and enemy related 
actions of their subordinate commanders at the tactical 
level, but they can track movement down to the lowest levels 
of their command, and Army and coalition counterpart blue 
forces in near-real time. The capabilities of FBCB2-BFT 
include map overlays, friendly force positioning, text 
messaging, line of sight analysis, and medical evacuation 
(MEDEVAC) requests. The transformational capabilities 
provided by FBCB2-BFT include increased SA capability 
through the detailed tracking of blue forces discussed 
previously, and the over the horizon communications via L-
Band satellite link. These capabilities allow any FBCB2-BFT 
user to graphically locate and communicate with other linked 
blue force units over extensive distances. This connectivity 
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could have an impact on how the Marine Corps defines and 
operationalizes C2 in the modern operational environment.  
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to analyze the effects 
of FBCB2-BFT on C2 and decision making at the Marine Corps 
battalion level and below. FBCB2-BFT was first fielded at 
the battalion level during Operations Enduring and Iraqi 
Freedom (OEF and OIF) in 2002. Since that time, the system 
has become ubiquitous from the division to squad level. 
Junior leaders now enjoy an increased SA via FBCB2-BFT that 
was initially only available to senior officers. The SA 
advantage provided through FBCB2-BFT to junior leaders 
develops their ability to make optimally informed decisions, 
but their decision rights are still determined by those with 
proper authority.  In order for them to possess the latitude 
to execute initiative, their decision rights must be 
advocated down the chain of command. The alternative is for 
senior officers within the chain of command to assume a more 
active management role using their own increased SA.  
This research provides some insight into whether or not 
doctrinal C2 architectures have changed as a result of 
FBCB2-BFT introduction, and how FBCB2-BFT specifically 
impacted C2 and decision making at the tactical level.  
C. THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
The introduction of advanced information technology 
(IT) systems has had an impact on the tactical level 
community, but how much impact it has had is an important 
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question to be asked and answered.  If operational decision 
makers are going to precede or at least evolve with 
inevitable IT changes, this answer must be discovered. 
Therefore, the primary research question of this thesis is 
how has the introduction of advanced IT systems [FBCB2-BFT] 
influenced C2 and decision making in an operational 
environment at the tactical level (Marine Corps battalion 
level) and below? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
Prior to answering the primary research question, the 
research must answer a few preliminary questions. 
Specifically: 
 What is C2? 
 
 What are the roles, functions, and 
responsibilities of the C2 architecture? 
 
 How does network positioning affect C2? 
 
 Does FBCB2-BFT allow for greater autonomy for 
decision making at the battalion level and 
below? 
D. SCOPE  
The scope of this thesis includes: 
 A discussion of the background regarding Marine 
Corps C2 doctrine and tactical level decision 
making. 
 An analysis of the current organizational 
architecture and decision rights hierarchy 
within the Marine Corps battalion model. 
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 A description of theories and concepts that are 
directly related to the subject matter. 
E. METHODOLOGY 
Marine Corps doctrinal publications provide the 
foundation for the Marine Corps’ C2 structure, and establish 
the scope of its decision making practices. Unit after-
action reports, service lessons learned, and previous 
research in this area were then used to introduce the 
traditional means by which tactical level units operated 
prior to the integration of IT systems, specifically FBCB2-
BFT.  
The research methodology focuses on evaluating the 
hypothesis that “FBCB2-BFT enables leaders to exercise 
greater autonomy in C2 and decision making at the battalion 
level and below.” This was accomplished through a 
qualitative and quantitative analysis of a convenience 
sample of data—specifically, opinions of officers that 
served and operated in tactical level billets with and 
without FBCB2-BFT—based on paired (before and after) 
information.  
Data collection was achieved using an Internet-based 
survey application. Surveys are continually used in both the 
commercial and government sectors to assess the impact of 
policy changes or quality of life. The Marine Officers 
provided an adequate sample, and results of which are likely 
to reflect opinions in the broader Marine Corps officer 
population in spite of the fact that the survey respondents 
were not a random sample of that population as will be 
explained in Chapter III.  
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F. ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS 
Chapter II, Literature Review, provides a brief history 
and description of the important concepts, theories and 
technologies appropriate to the assimilation of information 
systems and decision making. 
Chapter III explains the design and development of the 
survey instrument. It also discusses the IRB and survey 
fielding process. 
Chapter IV describes the qualitative and quantitative 
analysis and findings of the data. 
Chapter V provides a conclusion for the research study, 
as well as articulates areas that warrant further analysis 
through future research. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. THEORY AND DOCTRINE 
1. Command and Control  
The concept of C2, although not formally defined as a 
singular term until the 20th century, is one that has been 
theorized about and practiced for centuries as interrelated 
operational concepts (Alberts, Huber, & Moffat, 2010). Prior 
to this era, the focus was predominately on command, but did 
in fact include control as evidenced in the writings of 
Antoine-Henri Jomini in The Art of War about Napoleon I and 
his efforts to control dispersed troops (Jomini, 2004). It 
is important to understand the foundation and maturity of 
both the components and the composite concept of C2 because 
of its direct relationship with responsibility and decision 
making. One of the most well-known military theorists who 
spent much of his time and writings on this subject was Carl 
von Clausewitz. His most notable treatise was Vom Kriege, 
which translates into English as On War. Clausewitz, a 
Prussian soldier during the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries, followed what was deemed a traditional view of 
the control aspect of C2 during that time in that it “was 
limited by what the commander could see, and the distance 
travelled by visual and audio signals”  (Clausewitz, 1989). 
This belief was generally suitable for this era because 
battlefields were relatively small and well-defined, and 
battles were usually short in duration. Troops fought as a 
concentrated mass, and weapons were short-ranged by today’s 
standard. Even then, Clausewitz realized that the existence 
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of a tactical level was simply a reflection of the practical 
issues that face commanders, and the control measures that 
they adopt to overcome them. These “issues” included the 
“geography they operate in, the scale of forces involved, 
and the technology that defines the capabilities of these 
forces in terms of mobility and firepower, the logistics 
required to support them, and the communications that 
control them”  (Clausewitz, 1989).   
 Clausewitzian theories are still relevant and used 
today, albeit in a slightly different fashion. In fact, the 
Marine Corps doctrinal publication on C2 begins with a 
quotation from Clausewitz when introducing the nature of C2. 
It states that “The commander must work in a medium which 
his eyes cannot see; which his best deductive powers cannot 
always fathom; and with which, because of constant changes, 
he can rarely become familiar”  (U.S. Marine Corps, 1996). 
This quotation demonstrates how C2 doctrine has stood the 
test of time, but how it also requires updates to stay 
relevant with the changes brought forth by would-be 
adversaries. The discussion of C2 evolution must occur, 
because as the Marine Corps states “no single activity in 
war is more important than command and control” (U.S. Marine 
Corps, 1996). For the Marine Corps to truly convey its 
message and guidance on how today’s commanders must address 
this concept, they must first explain its definition and 
why it is so important. The Marine Corps sees C2 today as 
an activity that “encompasses all military functions and 
operations, giving them meaning and harmonizing them into a 
meaningful whole. None of the military functions and 
operations would be purposeful without command and 
control.” (U.S. Marine Corps, 1996) The harmonizing of all 
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functions and operations into a meaningful whole revolves 
around the military commander and the inherent C2 and 
decision-making responsibility accompanying their position; 
however, the direction and influence may vary (see Figure 
1).   
 
Figure 1.   Two views of the relationship between 
command and control (From: [U.S. Marine Corps, 1996]) 
It is important to note that C2 may function in more 
than one way, especially when considering that the role, 
capability and organization of the military continue to 
transform. The lack of a single finite answer affords the 
commander latitude, and it is this latitude that will be 
captured and analyzed to determine impact. It should already 
be apparent that C2 is intrinsically complex, which leads 
into the next section. 
a. Complexity in C2 
The Marine Corps acknowledges that war, military 
organizations, and military evolutions are complex (U.S. 
Marine Corps, 1996). Because the Marine Corps is setup as a 
hierarchical organization (i.e., squad-platoon-company-
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etc.), and because each level of the organization could be 
complex in and of itself, conceivably you could have levels 
of complexity within an already complex organization 
operating in a complex and unpredictable environment. It is 
this hierarchical structure and the interaction between 
levels that is pertinent to this research, because if 
independently they are complex, then their amalgamation will 
greatly affect the ability to conduct C2. Each part affects 
other parts in ways that simply cannot be anticipated, thus 
resulting in C2 complexity (U.S. Marine Corps, 1996).  
Two questions should be asked at this point: (1) 
How do commanders cope with this complexity, and (2) what 
options does doctrine provide the commander? The means by 
which commanders cope with complexity within their units is 
mostly something that is intangible and inherent within 
them, but they also have a delegation option that may 
mitigate their own C2 complexity. They must ensure that what 
they delegate falls under the confines of what is authorized 
by regulations and doctrine, while concurrently determining 
the potential impact on operations of disjointed C2, if what 
they delegate to their subordinates exceeds an acceptable 
level of information sharing. This acceptable level is 
really indeterminate, and at the root of the question of how 
advanced IT systems [FBCB2-BFT] enable decision making. 
Alternatively, the regulations and support 
provided by the Marine Corps are something very tangible. 
The Marine Corps has developed procedures and systems in an 
attempt to manage the C2 complexities in their organization 
and on the battlefield, and all of which appear to be 
directly correlated to information management (see Figure 
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2).  This figure provides one example of how the Marine 
Corps views the relationship between C2 and information 
flow, and if commanders follow the holistic view presented, 
they are likely to mitigate inherent complexities through 
improved personnel and system utilization. These aspects are 
unmistakably present and at the crux of Figure [2], and 
thus, should be employed to maximize C2 and decision-making 
capability. The presence of a C2 support structure is also 
an important aspect and will be further defined in the “C2 
Support” subsection of this chapter.   
 
Figure 2.   Elements of command and control (From: [U.S. 
Marine Corps, 2002]) 
b. InformationÆKnowledgeÆDecision 
  The idea of information management is not new to 
today’s Marine Corps as it was doctrinally present in 1994, 
but its progression has changed substantially in recent 
years appearing across the spectrum of doctrine, and in 
greater detail (U.S. Marine Corps, 1994). In 1994 the 
definition of C2 information management was “a process aimed 
at attaining timely critical information to support decision 
making and dissemination of decisive information to the 
right place, at the right time, and in a form that 
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influences appropriate action” (U.S. Marine Corps, 1994). It 
goes on to state that “information management is based on 
principles that govern its quality and flow throughout the 
cycle of collecting, transporting, processing, 
disseminating, and protecting information.” More recently, 
however, the Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) on 
Information Management, while presenting a similar approach 
to explaining information management, goes more in depth as 
it separates information into four classes within a 
hierarchical architecture (see Figure 3). It is the 
synthesizing of information (i.e., processed data class) 
into the eventual understanding class that is the focus of 
research, because this represents the baseline from which 
commanders harness the SA needed for optimally informed 
decisions. The MCWP states that the ultimate goal is to 
“facilitate the development of quality information 
throughout the information hierarchy, thus increasing its 
value and relevance and ensuring the development of 
understanding by the commander” (U.S. Marine Corps, 2002). 
Figure [3] shows how data flow eventually leads to decision 
making, but it is important to note that a transformation to 
knowledge and coupling with judgment occurs during the 
process. “Situational awareness can be obtained in some 
level with raw data, but it tends to strengthen as 
information moves through the information hierarchy.” 
[knowledge] (U.S. Marine Corps, 2002) 
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Figure 3.   Information flow (From: [U.S. Marine Corps, 
2002]) 
  A commonality of information, knowledge and 
decision making exists throughout C2, and the following 
quotation supports this statement: 
Confronted with a task, and having less 
information available than is needed to perform 
that task, an organization may react in either of 
two ways. One is to increase its information 
processing capacity, the other to design the 
organization, and indeed the task itself, in such 
a way as to enable it to operate on the basis of 
less information. These approaches are 
exhaustive; no others are conceivable. A failure 
to adopt one or the other will automatically 
result in a drop in the level of performance. 
(Creveld, 1985) 
  The important part of the information flow process 
is how SA is obtained by the commander for decision making. 
In the past, this was accomplished through a series of radio 
transmissions back and forth between the commander or his 
staff and subordinate units. It was through these radio 
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updates that the commander and his staff could build SA 
regarding the disposition of the battlefield. To best 
capture these updates, when time and environment allowed, a 
commander would have maps and other materials with a 
collective graphical depiction of the operational 
environment (see Figure 4). Information updates were both 
pushed from subordinates and pulled from the commander 
and/or his staff as necessary or directed. If control was 
necessary, it either came in the form of the commander 
guiding his subordinates, or the subordinate commander would 
execute autonomously. Again, time and environment were 
directly relevant and influential on how C2 was conducted 
(i.e., hostile vs. permissive environment).  
 
Figure 4.   Example paper map board (From: [Caceres & 
Swearingin, 2005]) 
The intent, as shown in Figure [3] and described 
in [20], is for the commander to be the decision maker at 
the end of the information flow process, which assumes an 
optimally informed decision. However, real-world tactical 
operations may preclude the commander from always being the 
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decision maker and/or receiving the information necessary to 
make the best decision.  Therefore, decision delegation must 
occur, and the beneficiary must be able to receive the same 
information as the commander.  Bridging the gaps between the 
inaccessible and accessible, and uninformed and informed 
through information systems integration is something very 
real and worth exploring.  This uninformed state may be the 
result of receiving erroneous, incomplete or inaccurate 
information, all of which are addressed by FBCB2-BFT. 
The introduction of advanced IT systems, such as 
FBCB2-BFT, allow commanders to tailor the vast amounts of 
information to suit their specific requirements through 
filtering techniques, and also enables the ability to share 
this tailored information as desired. Therefore, FBCB2-BFT 
provides the ability to reduce hierarchical information flow 
complexity that inherently exists within the C2 information 
flow process. As a byproduct of the COP provided by FBCB2-
BFT, organizations now have the ability for decision making 
to occur at the lowest levels.  
2. Roles, Functions, and Responsibilities 
a. Introduction 
  Thus far, the information provided has 
concentrated on the C2 aspect of tactical level operations, 
but in order to truly understand decision making and its 
development and role in the Marine Corps, we must introduce 
those personnel responsible for its execution.  First and 
foremost, it should be noted that “roles are the broad and 
enduring purposes for which the Marine Corps was established 
by Congress by law. Functions are specific responsibilities 
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assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense to enable 
the services to fulfill their legally established roles. 
Various laws, directives, and manuals establish the roles 
and functions of the Marine Corps and describe the general 
composition and responsibilities of the Marine Corps.” (U.S. 
Marine Corps, 2001) Some of the key sources that bind and 
reinforce these statements are Title 10, United States Code, 
Armed Forces; Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986; Department of Defense Directive 
5100.1, and Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 1-0. 
b. Commander and Command 
  Command, control, information management and 
decision making are all important enabling concepts for 
leaders within the Marine Corps to carry out their roles and 
responsibilities, but they are inadequate without the human 
controller.  Specifically for the Marine Corps, the human 
controller and focal point of tactical operations is the 
commander.  The person assigned the billet of commander is 
granted lawful command over a military unit of varying scope 
and function, as established in the preceding section. The 
term command, as defined by Joint Publication 1-02 is “the 
authority that a commander in the armed forces lawfully 
exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. 
Command includes the authority and responsibility for 
effectively using available resources and for planning the 
employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and 
controlling military forces for the accomplishment of 
assigned missions. It also includes responsibility for 
health, welfare, morale, and discipline of assigned 
personnel” (U.S. Joint Staff, 2001). The C2 process enables 
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the commander to exercise command across the extent of his 
force. It provides the means for the commander to develop an 
understanding of the situation, decide what actions are 
necessary, transmit orders to subordinate commanders, 
monitor the execution of those instructions, and assess the 
results. Command and control is the key to achieving unity 
of effort and realizing the full potential of the unit. 
Directly supporting the commander is a judiciously designed 
C2 infrastructure for obtaining, analyzing, and submitting 
information to them to assist in decision making, within 
which subordinate commanders are an essential part. However, 
the proper exercise of C2 remains the sole responsibility of 
the commander, indicating a strong level of autonomy at that 
level (U.S. Marine Corps, 2003).  
c. C2 Support 
  Collectively, the commander’s staff officers are 
accountable for the commander’s entire domain of 
responsibilities, unless otherwise specified by the 
commander. A staff officer’s authority is limited to 
advising, planning, and coordinating actions within their 
field of expertise or interest. The commander might also 
grant a staff officer added authority to act within their 
expertise or interest. Ultimately, staff officers are 
responsible for acquiring information and analyzing its 
implications to provide timely and accurate recommendations 
to the commander. Effective C2 support of expeditionary 
operations demands an unyielding effort on the part of the 
commander’s staff, and “the ability to exercise effective C2 
is critical to the success of what the Marine Corps calls 
its Marine Air-Ground Task Force.” (U.S. Marine Corps, 2003) 
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d. Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) 
  The Marine Corps’ overarching scalable model from 
which its tactical level commander functions is called a 
MAGTF (pronounced Mag Taff).  A MAGTF is made up of four 
core elements, which are: (1) Command Element (CE), (2) 
Ground Combat Element (GCE), (3) Aviation Combat Element 
(ACE), and (4) Logistics Combat Element (LCE, (formerly 
CSSE)) (see Figure 5). With the MAGTF model, the Marine 
Corps is able to task organize for operations consistent 
with its statutory tasking to provide combined arms forces 
to the Joint Commander. The MAGTF is a balanced, air-ground 
combined arms team under the control of a single commander, 
and structured to accomplish a specific mission (U.S. Marine 
Corps, 2001). 
 
Figure 5.   MAGTF organization (From: [U.S. Marine 
Corps, 2001]) 
e. Expeditionary Maneuver from the Sea 
  Expeditionary Maneuver from the Sea, the Marine 
Corps’ current operational concept, forms the basis for 
developing the MAGTF C2 process.  Expeditionary Maneuver 
from the Sea demands a C2 process that provides maximum 
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flexibility in the execution of the mission in accordance 
with the commander’s intent. To enable this kind of focused 
flexibility the Marine Corps requires a robust information 
infrastructure. Any future global information grid (GIG) 
must be designed to allow members of the commander’s staff 
to locate and retrieve information to form decisions. The 
risk of information deluge or faulty retrieval is 
significant and therefore must be minimized at all cost. 
Similarly, the Marine Corps believes that it must continue 
to train its leaders to recognize situations based on the 
information provided, and to act with confidence and 
autonomy when that information is inconsistent or incomplete 
(U.S. Marine Corps, 2008). 
f. People and Information 
  The undeniable catalyst of the C2 system is 
people. People gather information, make decisions, take 
action, communicate, and cooperate with one another to 
accomplish a common mission. Effective C2 starts with 
qualified people and a common philosophy that is developed 
and presented by the commander. Information refers to 
representations of reality used to inform decisions and 
actions. Ultimately, C2 is about information: getting it, 
judging its value, processing it into useful form, acting on 
it, and sharing it with others. Without a C2 support 
structure to develop information, commanders must have the 
confidence and willingness to either pursue certainty or 
cope with uncertainty.  Either way, they are the ones 
ultimately held responsible for the results (U.S. Marine 
Corps, 2003). 
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3. Network Science 
a. Power and Influence 
  Merriam-Webster defines “power” as “legal or 
official authority,” which as discussed previously is an 
attribute innate in the role of commander.  However, it also 
defines power as “the ability to act or produce an effect 
and possession of control, authority, or influence over 
others.”  It is this second definition, and in particular 
the word influence, that sets commanders apart in network 
science.  Power [authority] may be innate, but influence is 
produced.  The notions of power and influence are nearly 
synonymous with one another, but when examined from a 
network science perspective they are distinct.  Knowledge is 
commonly referred to as power, but it is its synthesis into 
information that is truly influential to C2 and decision 
making.  The introduction and development of the IT systems 
network has revolutionized the ability to access knowledge, 
but only those with positions in the network can capitalize 
on information and influence. 
  When the study of networks was conducted by 
Leonhard Euler in the 1780s the focus was more on abstract 
mathematics and less on the sociological power derivative, 
but as the more modern networks emerged the focus of 
research has changed (Barabasi, 2002). Modern researchers, 
such as Jeffrey Pfeffer and Linton Freeman, have taken a new 
approach that studies the impact of networks on individuals 
and individuals on networks.  Pfeffer and Freeman have 
examined networks for their impact on human communications 
[power and influence].  They believe that by understanding 
how networks function and grow, one can develop strategies 
 21
to take advantage of that growth. The integral element of 
the end result is a concept called network centrality 
(Barabasi, 2002). 
b. Network Centrality 
  Real-world networks are not randomly distributed, 
consequently resulting in positions of greater power and 
influence for those with the most and shortest connections 
(Barabasi, 2002; Pfeffer, 1992).  “To develop influence, we 
need to be plugged into the structure of communication and 
interaction, and that means seeking out interactions, even 
social interactions, strategically” (Pfeffer, 1992). The 
takeaway from this quote by Pfeffer is that the ability to 
influence is available to those connected. Without 
technology, connecting was accomplished by physical 
proximity or by seeking out interaction, but as advanced IT 
systems such as FBCB2-BFT have become integrated into 
tactical networks, connections can now occur with masses of 
people simultaneously over long distances. Consequently, 
commanders are afforded the ability to exert power and 
influence on a larger scale.   
  One concept that Freeman created to describe this 
notion of centrality is called betweenness.  In essence, 
betweenness is the extent to which a person falls between 
other individuals on the communications path that links them 
(Freeman, 1977). The gist of betweenness and centrality 
within a network is best shown graphically using examples of 
today’s network topologies (see Figure 6).  The left side of 
Figure [6] shows a star topology where a short path exists 
between each outer node and the hub (center node), but at 
the risk of the hub being a single point of failure. In this 
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instance, the hub is really the only node with any 
significant level of betweenness.  With the fully connected 
mesh topology on the right side of Figure [6], where all 
nodes are connected equally, the likelihood of failure is 
considerably reduced (Freeman, 1977).  In this instance, all 
nodes share the same level of betweenness. 
 
 
Figure 6.   Network topologies (From: [Saldana, Shannon, 
& Chow, 2007]) 
  The FBCB2-BFT network most closely resembles the 
latter topology in Figure [6] in that a shared level of 
betweenness exists between nodes, and thus the question of 
decentralized C2 and decision making could be raised.  
However, with the introduction of Figure [7], which displays 
a powerful illustrative example of the hierarchical 
relationship that exists in the Marine Corps between 
commanders’ and C2 systems, the introduced complexity 
counters the decentralization argument (see Figure 7).  
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Figure 7.   Commander’s relationship to C2 systems 
(From: [Coakley, 1992]) 
  Inevitably, the FBCB2-BFT network supports the 
opportunity for decentralized C2 and decision making.  
However, because of inherent organizational complexity and 
commander’s discretion, decentralization may not occur.  The 
ability to exert power and influence through the FBCB2-BFT 
network exists, and although Marine Corps doctrine advocates 
one approach [decentralization and initiative]; commanders 
are ultimately the employment decision makers. 
B. THEORY AND DOCTRINE MEET TECHNOLOGY 
1. Chronology of IT Systems 
As previously mentioned, the C2 of dispersed forces is 
dependent on information flow between commanders and 





following sections of Chapter II will discuss the 
technologies from which FBCB2-BFT evolved, and its current 
capabilities.  
a. Short-range, Two-way Radiotelephone 
  For purposes of this research, modern Marine Corps 
tactical communications networks began with the Army/Navy 
Portable Radio Communication (AN/PRC)-77 transceiver that 
was the workhorse during the Vietnam conflict (see Figure 
8). This system entered service in 1968, and was the COP and 
C2 enabler for its time through its short-ranged, two-way 




Figure 8.   AN/PRC-77 (From: [AN/PRC-77 Tactical Radio 
Set, 2007]) 
b. SINCGARS and EPLRS 
 The next set of technological developments came 
about in the early 1980s, but did not see substantial 
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distribution until the late 1980s-early 1990s. The Single 
Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS) radio 
and Enhanced Position Location Reporting System (EPLRS) 
networked systems (see Figure 9) added substantial 
capability to Marine Corps tactical communication and 
information. The combination of these systems enable secure 
and jam resistant voice and data communications in near-real 
time, and were the primary components that formed the 
backbone of the tactical internet for the regimental level 
and below (Caceres & Swearingin, 2005). This combination 
also introduced the concept of communications on the move 
(COTM).  
 
Figure 9.   AN/PRC-77 and EPLRS RT-1720C(C/G) (From: 
[Caceres & Swearingin, 2005]) 
c. C2PC w/ DACT 
 In the mid-1990s, the next generation of C2 
technologies was the ubiquitous Windows-based client 
application known as Command and Control Personal Computer 
(C2PC), and the C2PC hosting platform called the Data 
Automated Communications Terminal (DACT). 
 C2PC is not a system but instead an application 
that can be deployed on a variety of programs. C2PC started 
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out as a COP-viewer with its tactical map display, but 
evolved into a full-fledged COP-client through a GUI that 
allowed for full track add, modify and delete capabilities, 
an extensive overlays production capability, numerous 
tactical decision aids, and the ability to send and receive 
tactical messages.  
 The primary carrier of C2PC for the Marine Corps 
was the DACT-PC, which also has a mounted (M-DACT) and 
dismounted (D-DACT) version (see Figure 10). The family of 
DACTs is GPS-enabled and provides the ability to self locate 
and self report (Caceres & Swearingin, 2005). 
 
Figure 10.   C2PC supported variants (After: [(Caceres & 
Swearingin, 2005) and  (Wagner, 2006)]) 
 The topology of the C2PC network was unique and 
brought about tremendous value through its ability to handle 
different versions of clients and gateways, act as a server 
and prevent COP disruptions, and have a multi-tier 
architecture that could be extended (see Figure 11). 
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Figure 11.   Basic C2PC network topology (From: [Caceres 
& Swearingin, 2005]) 
 As with its predecessor, C2PC maintains only a LOS 
capability since the Marine Corps was still dependent upon 
the EPLRS data network as the backbone. This leads to 
present day systems. 
d. FBCB2-BFT and SATCOM  
  Force XXI Battle Command Brigade and Below-Blue 
Force Tracker is the L-band satellite communications 
(SATCOM)-based variant of the United States Army’s FBCB2 
ground radio-based communications platform, which was 
originally designed and fielded for three missions: (1) To 
allow U.S. Army units below the brigade level to “see” 
Marine positions on their FBCB2 network, (2) To complement 
the COP provided by the intelligence operations workstation 
(IOW) and M-DACT, and (3) To allow non-line-of-sight (NLOS) 
two-way messaging (Stengrim, 2005). The SATCOM capability 
was provided by merging with a commercial satellite network 
which makes the system sensitive but still unclassified 
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(Austin, 2006). The initially undocumented but important 
benefits the system provides are the unprecedented SA and C2 
to ground forces engaging in combat, which result in the 
speeding up of war [increased operational tempo] and saving 
of lives (Guenther, 2004). The components of the FBCB2-BFT 
consist of a computer, used to display location information; 
a satellite terminal and antenna, used to transmit location 
and other military data, and a GPS receiver to determine its 
own position (see Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12.   FBCB2-BFT components (From: [Conatser & 
Grizio, 2005]) 
 The FBCB2 concept was initiated by the Army’s 
Program Executive Office Command Control Communications – 
Tactical (PEO C3T) and awarded to TRW Inc. (part of Northrop 
Grumman since 2002) in 1995. It was first put into use in 
Yugoslavia in 1998, but did not see large scale employment 
until Operations Enduring and Iraqi Freedom in late 2002-
early 2003 (Potts, Szcepanski, & Abejon, 2003). The Beyond 
Line of Sight (BLOS) capability was a principle reason for 
creating the BFT variant, and this capability was integral 
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to operations in the mountainous terrain of Afghanistan and 
with the speed of the initial invasion into Iraq. 
  The FBCB2-BFT gathers and graphically depicts 
information through a terrain-mapped GUI, allows individuals 
to exchange voice, video, or other data securely, and most 
importantly, provides a shared SA display. It is equipped in 
many types of vehicle platforms such as tanks, High Mobility 




Figure 13.   FBCB2-BFT installation variants (From: 
[Conatser & Grizio, 2005]) 
  In addition to displaying the location of all 
friendly vehicles equipped with the system on the computer's 
display, the FBCB2-BFT can also be used as a mechanism for 
reporting the locations of enemy forces and other 
battlefield conditions (e.g., the location of mine fields, 
battlefield obstacles, damaged bridges). As these updates 
are occurring, the system continually transmits this 
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information over the FBCB2 and SATCOM networks to central 
locations called tactical operations centers (TOC). It is 
the integration of the TOC where the loop is closed on the 
FBCB2-SATCOM architecture. (see Figure 14). 
 
 
Figure 14.   FBCB2-BFT architecture (From: [Austin, 
2006]) 
 
  The FBCB2 and FBCB2-BFT integration of systems are 
widely considered a huge success. They have won numerous 
prestigious awards, and are a fratricide preventer for 
vehicles equipped with the system (Shachtman & Axe, 2006). 
Units equipped with FBCB2-BFT enjoy tremendous advantages 
over units without it, as emphasized by the quotation “Unit 
situation awareness has improved exponentially to levels 
achievable just 10 years earlier. Knowledge of situational 
awareness facilitates better situational understanding and 
decision making. FBCB2 enables commanders and leaders to 
command and control units more efficiently and effectively 
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and adapt more quickly than the enemy” (Robb, 2006). The 
following excerpt from Shane Robb’s FBCB2: past, present, 
and future provides a great example of how this system 
compares to its non-technological supported predecessors: 
What does blue force tracking look like from the 
standpoint of the soldiers who use it? With BFT, 
there are no more map sheets spread out on a 
HMMWV hood, with soldiers battling sandstorms to 
paste sticky notes marking critical information. 
Computer terminals provide easy to interpret, 
moving blue icons on digitized maps and the 
latest available accurate satellite imagery for 
navigation, with regular information updates 
marking a huge contrast to missions based on 
static paper map information, which is often 
inaccurate and grows more stale with each minute 
and hour it takes forces to approach their 
target. (Robb, 2006) 
FBCB2-BFT has unquestionably delivered numerous 
advantageous capabilities for Marine Corps tactical level 
units, and there appears to be no shortage of analogous 
systems on the acquisitions horizon (U.S. Army, 2010). 
However, the vast majority of FBCB2-BFT literature appears 
to exclusively focus on the increased connectedness it 
provides, and does not accompany it with an evaluation of 
the impacts on the real power behind the network – the 
people. 
Knowing that future IT systems will provide 
similar capabilities as the FBCB2-BFT, it is essential that 
it be scrutinized in its entirety to ensure proper 
organizational [Marine Corps] integration and development. 
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C. CHAPTER SUMMARY 
The literature offers insight into the synergistic 
relationship between information and decision making. It 
suggests that distance is becoming less relevant for the 
execution of C2, and information is quickly reaching a point 
of saturation as a result of information systems 
integration. The end result appears to be greater 
flexibility for the handling and delegation of C2 and 
decision rights, and better distribution of information.  
The certainty and impact of these premises are still 
undetermined since FBCB2-BFT inception was relatively 
recent, which leads to the origin of this thesis. 
 The literature suggests that the Marine Corps, and by 
logical extension the Department of Defense (DoD), has yet 
to understand how the integration of new information 
technologies into existing C2 structures will impact the 
ability of its commanders to effectively use their authority 
(power and influence) to accomplish mission objectives. 
Underlying issues such as those resistant to change and 
hierarchical constraints are likely present. Therefore, in 
addition to the already existing challenges that accompany 
the role, function and responsibility of command, commanders 
now face the difficult task of new system integration into 
their organizations.  
 The follow-on chapters will show the analytical trends 
resultant from the union of advanced IT systems and the 





A Web-based survey was distributed in April of 2010 to 
gain insight into the use of the BFT2 system from Marine 
officers with operational experience. The survey consisted of 
50 questions and was partitioned into four major parts: 
demographics and operational experience, C2 experiences in a 
predeployment training environment, C2 experiences in a 
combat environment, and general opinion questions.  
A. SURVEY DESCRIPTION 
The survey began with a section focused on demographics 
and operational experience. Officers were first asked if 
they had served in a combat zone and then to identify how 
many separate OEF and OIF tours. Officers without combat 
experience were automatically advanced to the general 
opinion questions. Officers identified the operation (OEF or 
OIF) and year they returned from the subject deployment. 
They were asked to identify the highest rank attained, 
billet held and organizational level for this deployment. 
Billets were generalized into commander, executive officer, 
staff sections, and aviator. Officers could also type in 
their billet if it was not listed.  Officers selected unit 
levels ranging from platoon to Marine Expeditionary Force. 
Next, the officers were provided an explanation of the BFT 
and identified whether they had used the system and how they  
 
                     
2 From this point forward, the acronym “BFT” will be used in lieu of 
“FBCB2-BFT.” This approach was taken due to organizational inconsistency 
(Most Marines know and refer to the system as “BFT”) and on the 
recommendation of the survey focus group.     
 34
learned to use it. Respondents who had not used the system 
were automatically advanced to the general opinion 
questions. 
The second section focused on C2 during the officers’ 
predeployment training. In order to refine the C2 
environment, several questions referred specifically to 
operations conducted “outside the wire.” For the purposes of 
this survey, the term “outside the wire” was loosely defined 
as operations conducted off an established forward operating 
base. Examples of outside the wire operations include 
patrols; convoys; route clearance; engineering; close air 
support, etc. Temporary combat outposts and patrol bases 
could be considered outside the wire. Types of 
communications systems were identified for each of the C2 
scenario. Next, officers rated their immediate commander’s 
and their personal exercise of mission command.  
The third section focused on the respondents’ combat 
experience. Questions in this section were identical to the 
predeployment section with the phrase “combat deployment” 
replacing “predeployment training.” 
The fourth and final section consisted of five opinion 
questions. Officers were asked two 5-point Likert scale 
questions, two open ended question and an opportunity for 
additional comments. All questions in this section provided 
an opportunity for further explanation or comments. The 
section ended with some additional demographic questions. A 
copy of the survey instrument is contained in the Appendix. 
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B. SAMPLE DESCRIPTION 
 Survey respondents consisted of Marine Corps officer 
students at Naval Postgraduate School (NPS), Defense 
Language Institute (DLI), Marine Corps Command and Staff 
College (MCCSC) and Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS). In 
addition, the survey was also inadvertently completed by 
officers throughout the Marine Corps as a result of 
forwarding by some of the original recipients. Due to the 
anonymous nature of the Web-based survey, no breakdown of 
responses by institution is available.  
 The student populations at NPS, DLI, MCCSC and EWS were 
selected to receive the survey for two reasons. First, they 
provided a broad and diverse range of military occupational 
specialties and ranks typically resident at the tactical 
level. NPS alone has roughly 200 company and field grade 
officers from all elements of the MAGTF. Second, these 
institutions all fall under the cognizance of Marine Corps 
Training and Education Command; therefore, solicitation 
approval was only required from one command. This approach 
was taken in coordination with, and approval of, 
Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC), Manpower and Reserve 
Affairs (MPP-50), which is the approval authority for 
surveys conducted within the Marine Corps.   
 As a convenience sample, the data provided in the 
survey and subsequent analysis cannot be treated as 
statistically generalizable to the entire Marine officer 
population. Nonetheless, the survey results are likely to 
reflect general opinions in the broader Marine Corps officer 
population indicating that the research question is one that 
can be answered by this convenience sample.   
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C. FIELDING PROCEDURES 
 Survey creation occurred over several months and went 
through multiple iterations. After gaining Institutional 
Review Board (IRB) approval (see Appendix for a copy of the 
approval letter), the survey was distributed to a ten-person 
focus group at NPS. The group consisted of graduate students 
in the Information Systems Technology and Manpower 
Management curriculums and all had operational experience 
with the BFT. The purpose of the focus group was to elicit 
feedback on the survey instrument. Group members were asked 
to comment on the clarity, flow, conciseness, and wording. 
Feedback from this group was incorporated into the final 
version.  This type of "pretesting" is good survey practice. 
 Distributing the survey via the Internet as a Web-based 
survey rather than personal interviews was preferred for 
several reasons. First, electronic distribution allowed for 
greater access to a distributed target population, enabling 
EWS and MCCSC students to participate.  Personal interviews 
for these populations would have been infeasible due to time 
constraints and schedule conflicts. Second, electronic 
distribution allowed for automation, which made it easier to 
survey a larger group, and it saved both time and money. 
Third, the support provided by NPS and its subscription to 
SurveyMonkey provided a cost effective and efficient medium.  
 The survey link was distributed to the target audience 
via an e-mail solicitation (see the Appendix) on 3 May 2010. 
Time spent completing the survey averaged approximately 10 
minutes.  The survey was taken offline on 10 June 2010.  
None of the questions were mandatory, and therefore could be 
skipped. Out of 147 responses, 114 were deemed useful and 
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included in the study. The 33 discarded surveys were deemed 
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IV. RESULTS 
This chapter is divided into three sections: (a) 
demographics, (b) comparison of C2 scenarios between 
training and combat, and (c) summary statistics and 
vignettes for select survey questions. Descriptive 
statistics are used in all categories and inferential 
statistics are used in Chapter IV.C.3 
A. DEMOGRAPHICS 
 The respondents ranged in rank from First Lieutenant 
(1stLt) through Colonel (Col) with the most common rank 
being Captain (Capt). All respondents are combat veterans of 
OEF, OIF or both. Organizational levels and primary areas of 
billet responsibility held during the combat tour addressed 
in the survey spanned all four elements of the MAGTF and 
included transition teams and higher-level joint staffs. 
Organizational levels ranged from platoon to Corps with 
battalion/squadron level being the most common. Command 
billets represented 34% of the responses with aviators and 
staff officers comprising the rest. Figures [15] and [16] 
illustrate the organizational level and billet breakout, 
respectively.   
 
 
                     
3 As discussed in Chapter III, the respondents to this survey 
constitute a convenience sample from the Marine Corps officer corps. 
Thus, some caution is warranted in the interpretation of the inferential 
statistics. To the extent that the sample is representative of the 
entire Corps, these results may be generalizable. However, because of 
the convenience sample, these results also may only reflect the opinions 





Figure 15.   The distribution of command levels by 
respondents, where “N” indicates the number of 
respondents in each category.  The percentage of 
respondents in each command level out of the total 
number of respondents is shown at the top of each bar. 
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Figure 16.   The distribution of billet types by 
respondents, where “N” indicates the number of 
respondents in each category. The percentage of 
respondents in each billet type out of the total 
number of respondents is shown at the top of each bar. 
 All 114 respondents served in a designated combat zone; 
93.9% served in OIF, 31.5% served in OEF and 25.4% served in 
both. The number of OIF tours ranged from one to four or 
more with one tour (39%) being the most common followed 
closely by two tours (33%). Ninety-two percent of OEF 
veterans served one tour in Afghanistan. Respondents were 
not asked to specify tour length (i.e., seven or fourteen 
months).  
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 For the purposes of this survey, respondents were asked 
to choose one specific deployment to reference; 80% selected 
OIF while 20% chose OEF. Respondents identified the year of 
this deployment with the distribution shown below in Table 
[1].  
 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
1.8 7.1 6.2 16.8 17.7 23.9 23.9 2.7 
Table 1.   Year returned from combat deployment where 
numbers represent percent of sample 
When asked if they participated in predeployment 
training, more than three out of four respondents (79%) 
stated they partook in collective unit level predeployment 
training, such as Mojave Viper or a battalion field 
exercise. Of those who conducted predeployment training, 
most (71%) served in the same billet during their subsequent 
deployment. Most officers surveyed (92%) used the BFT and 
learned through a combination of formal and informal 
methods. BFT use during predeployment training was rare with 
almost half of the respondents stating the system was not 
available to them. Conversely, during their combat 
deployment, officers’ use of BFT increased drastically with 
most using the system every day or multiple times per day. 
Figure [17] shows the usage of BFT in predeployment training 
and combat.  
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Figure 17.   A comparison of BFT use between training and 
combat, where “N” indicates the number of respondents 
in each category. Blue columns indicate BFT use during 
training while red columns indicate BFT use during 
combat.  
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL SCENARIO FINDINGS 
We compared the officers’ own training without (or with 
limited use of) BFT prior to their deployment against the 
officers’ deployment experiences with BFT to establish a 
before and after scenario. Most of the officers had recent 
relevant experience with collective predeployment training 
that covered similar types of operations to those conducted 
in OEF/OIF but without or limited use of BFT. Respondents 
were asked to focus their answers only on the deployment and 
the associated predeployment training in which they used the 
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BFT system the most, or that the BFT had the most impact. 
This distinction was necessary to create a pairing between 
training and combat. Data in this section include only 
responses from officers who both conducted predeployment 
training and filled the same billet during their subsequent 
combat deployment. Sixty-three respondents met this 
criterion. Questions focused on such aspects of C2 as 
frequency of BFT use, frequency of duties taking place 
outside the wire, push and pull information flow, 
hierarchical communications, significant event reporting 
requirements and mission command. 
1. BFT Use 
BFT use rose significantly in combat. Almost 50% of 
respondents who had predeployment BFT training stated that 
BFT was unavailable to them during collective training while 
the same amount stated they used the system more than once 
per day in combat. Only 7% stated that BFT was unavailable 
or they never used the system in combat. 
2. Outside the Wire 
In order to gain an appreciation of how the BFT was 
used for C2, respondents were asked to identify how often 
their billet responsibilities demanded they operate outside 
the wire. The goal was to limit the C2 systems only to those 
available to a Marine in a field environment. A minority of 
officers (13%) never left the wire during training, while 
35% did so almost every day. Exactly half the officers 
conducted operations outside the wire while deployed whereas 




Figure 18.   A distribution of outside the wire instances 
between training and combat, where “N” indicates the 
number of respondents in each category. Blue columns 
represent training and red columns indicate combat.  
3. Information Push 
 No difference was found in information push between 
training and combat. The majority of respondents (66%) 
stated that they received information several times per day 
while operating outside the wire compared with 69% in 
combat. However, the system used to push this information 
changed significantly. Radio transmission accounted for 75% 
of information push during training whereas combat shows an 
almost even split between radio and BFT with 32% and 34% 
respectively. Figure [19] displays the use of different 




Figure 19.   Distribution of “While operating "outside 
the wire" which communications system did your HHQ 
primarily use to push information to you?” where “N” 
indicates the number of respondents in each category. 
Blue columns indicate training and red columns 
represent combat. 
4. Information Pull 
 Like information push, little difference was found 
between training and combat with regards to information 
pull. Most officers (60% in training and 57% in combat) were 
asked by their HHQ for information outside normal reporting 
times more than once a day. Radio communications were the 
primary means of information pull in training (76%) and this 
again was divided with BFT in combat at 35% and 37%, 
respectively. Figure [20] shows the distribution of 
communications systems used by HHQ to pull information. 
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Figure 20.   Distribution of “While operating "outside 
the wire" which communications system did your HHQ 
primarily use to pull information to you?” where “N” 
indicates the number of respondents in each category. 
Blue columns indicate training and red columns 
represent combat. 
5. Hierarchical Communications 
Officers were asked “How often did you receive orders 
from a headquarters higher than your immediate command (for 
example you are a platoon commander and you receive an order 
directly from your battalion)?” During training, 58% of 
respondents answered “never” while 18% responded “almost 
every day.” Combat saw a 3% increase in “almost every day” 
occurrences to 21%, while “never” decreased to 37%. Figure 
[21] shows the distribution in responses.  
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Figure 21.   Distribution of responses to, “How often did 
you receive orders from a HHQ higher than your 
immediate command?”, where “N” indicates the number of 
respondents in each category. Blue columns indicate 
training and red columns represent combat. 
6. Significant Event Reporting 
 This section of the survey attempted to establish 
whether or not reporting requirements changed between 
training and combat. However, due to ambiguous wording in 
the survey instrument, it was decided not to include 
responses to this question in the analysis. 
7. Mission Command 
 Respondents were asked to rate their immediate 
supervisor’s use of mission command on a 1-5 Likert scale 
with 1 being the worst and 5 the best. Responses for 
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training showed a 3.82 mean with a 1.17 standard deviation. 
When asked how their immediate supervisor’s use of mission 
command changed during the deployment, 44% stated there was 
“no change” while 46% said improvement occurred. Only 10% 
showed a decline.  
 In addition to rating their immediate commander, 
officers also rated their own use of mission command. 
Officers rated themselves a 3.93 during training and all 
respondents either noted no change or an improvement during 
combat. No officers demonstrated a decline.  
C. OPINION RESPONSES 
Respondents were asked to provide their opinion 
concerning BFT’s impact on C2 and decision making. 
Presentation of this data differs from section [b] in that 
these responses are reflective of the entire sample 
independent of training or combat correlation. To provide a 
greater understanding of the data, relevant vignettes are 
included to capture some of the more pertinent narratives 
supporting and dissenting from the majority position.4 
1. BFT’s Effect on Mission Accomplishment 
 Of the 64 officers that provided an answer, a majority 
stated that the inclusion of BFT into their communications 
architecture improved their ability to accomplish their 
mission. Only one officer dissented and 25 stated no change. 
Figure [22] shows BFT's effect on mission accomplishment. 
                     
4 The rank, operation and year attributed to the vignette reflect the 
respondent's rank and year of deployment referenced in the survey, not 
his/her current rank or position. 
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Figure 22.   Distribution of responses to, “In your 
opinion, how did the incorporation of BFT into your 
unit's communications architecture affect your ability 
to accomplish your mission?”, where “N” indicates the 
number of respondents in each category. 
Supporting Vignettes 
-“BFT was essential while operating in Afghanistan due to 
the vast distances that were covered.” (Major, OEF, 2009) 
-“BFT is fantastic; secure BFT would be ideal... however, 
the big danger is tunneling into the BFT and not observing 
your surroundings... becoming a "BFT Zombie" is a big hazard 
for a lot of folks.” (Capt, OIF, 2007) 
-“The mission would have been greatly impeded if the BFT was 
not available. The Comms coverage in country was not at a 
sustainable level. Multiple unit shifts and unit moves 
 51
hindered the ability of our unit to talk directly with the 
units whose AO we were in.” (Maj, OIF, 2008) 
-“BFT and the Moving Map Kneeboard for pilots, increased the 
Situational Awareness of pilots exponentially. The ability 
to use over the horizon communication to talk to the 
squadron headquarters help out a lot.” (Capt, OEF, 2009) 
Dissenting Vignette 
-“BFT was used as a crutch.  At times "All Hands" info was 
passed via BFT. When I or Marines in my command were not 
vehicle mounted they would not receive the information. In a 
follow-on deployment my unit was the only foot mobile 
company. As a result we lacked significant situational 
awareness of events and Bn Traffic because we were not privy 
to the BFT traffic.” (Capt, OIF, 2006) 
2. Hierarchy Changes 
 A total of 79 officers responded to this question; 
however, because the survey did not include a multiple 
choice option, we classified each narrative response into 
“Yes,” “No” or “Depends.” We were unable to classify eight 
of the responses leaving 71 usable answers. When asked if 
leaders should adjust C2 architecture at the tactical level 
to exploit the capabilities offered by BFT, almost 82% 
stated no. Figure [23] shows the results.  
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Figure 23.   Distribution of responses to, “Should 
leaders adjust command and control architecture at the 
tactical level to exploit the capabilities offered by 
BFT (For example, flattening the organization by 
eliminating a layer of command), or should traditional 
hierarchies be kept in place?” where “N” indicates the 
number of respondents in each category. 
Supporting Vignettes 
-“Maintain traditional hierarchies. It is still much more 
effective for a Battalion to concern themselves with 3-4 
maneuver elements, with subordinate maneuver elements than 
to try and individually manage 10-20 platoon and squads 
roaming through the battle space. Companies can effectively 
provide organic support as required for most significant 
events (i.e., QRF request), and request additional support 
from Bn if necessary or more resources required (i.e., Heavy  
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QRF with Tanks)—but Battalion could quickly become 
overloaded Co level COC removed from common operational 
picture.” (1stLt, OIF, 2009) 
-“Keep traditional hierarchies or collect every MCDP-1 and 
burn it!” (1stLt, OIF, 2006) 
-”leave tactical hierarchies in place. BFT reports position 
location and additional information as transmitted by the 
sender. It does not enhance higher HQ's situational 
awareness to the point that it is practical or advisable to 
eliminate a layer in the chain of command.” (Capt, OEF, 
2009) 
-“Absolutely not. Roles at various levels of command cannot 
be addressed through a flattened command hierarchy. HHQ's 
perspective is enhanced through BFT, but nonetheless 
restricted in its scope. Promulgating commands via BFT to 
subordinate units is only communication; command is much 
broader than communication alone.” (1stLt, OIF, 2005) 
Dissenting Vignettes 
-“Heck, if BFT can be used as another reason to trim fat off 
of the typically bloated HHQ personnel staffing... run with 
it.” (Maj, OIF, 2007) 
-“I would have to say it’s all situational dependent- Yes, 
there will be several occasions when this will be beneficial 
for a mission to succeed. The more centralized a command is 
at the tactical level while conducting distributed 
operation, the greater chance you have in losing momentum. 
Pushing control to the lower levels (if they are properly 
trained) can be a force multiplier. Traditional hierarchies 
functions only if they are not violated—there must be unity 
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of command and more importantly, the subordinate units need 
to know who is in charge.” (1stLt, OIF, 2009) 
3. BFT’s Effect on Tactical Level Decision Making 
A total of 64 respondents provided an answer. The 
majority (52%) feel the BFT system has no impact on decision 
rights. For those officers that did notice a change, 37% 
said that decision rights have shifted to senior leaders. 
Only 11% believe the BFT has shifted decision rights down 
the chain of command. No additional comments were provided 
for this question; therefore, no vignettes are included. 
Figure [24] shows BFT's impact on decision rights. 
 
Figure 24.   Distribution of responses to, ”With the 
inclusion of BFT, it’s possible that decision rights 
at the tactical level have shifted down the chain of 
command or it’s possible that they’ve shifted up the 
chain of command with senior officers assuming a more 
active management role due to their increased 
situational awareness. In your opinion, how have 
decision rights been affected by BFT?” where “N” 
indicates the number of respondents in each category. 
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 Further analysis revealed that many of respondents who 
feel decision rights have shifted to senior leaders are 
aviators. Therefore, we further categorized the respondents 
into “Aviator” and “Ground” based on their demographic 
data.5 This categorization reduced the sample from 64 to 58 
(12 aviator/46 ground) usable responses. When we included 
this variable, the data shows aviators disproportionally 
(83%) believe decision rights shifted to senior leaders 
compared to 65% of ground officers who believe the BFT has 
not affected decision rights. Figure [25] shows the 





Figure 25.   Percentage distribution of responses 
categorized by ground or aviation  
                     
5 The term “Aviator” only applies to those respondents with a 
corresponding MOS (i.e., 7566, 7588, etc). Ground based aviation related 
MOSs were placed in the “Ground” category. 
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 Fisher’s Exact test for quantitative statistical 
analysis is used for this question to determine if there are 
nonrandom associations between two categorical variables 
(23). The test showed a statistically significant difference 
(p < .0001) between Aviators and Ground MOS how decision 
rights have shifted to senior leaders.  
4. Greater Autonomy at the Tactical Level 
Respondents were asked, “Do you feel BFT allows for 
greater autonomy in decision making at the tactical level? 
Why or why not?” Since this question did not offer a 
multiple choice (yes or no) option in the survey form, 
narratives were evaluated to categorize the responses into 
“Yes,” “No” and “Depends.” A total of 82 respondents 
provided an answer; however, 13 did not contain sufficient 
information to make a categorical determination, leaving 69 
usable answers.  
 Forty-six percent of respondents feel that BFT does not 
allow for greater autonomy in decision making at the 
tactical level while 42% believe it does and 11% think it 
depends. Figure [26] illustrates this distribution. 
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Figure 26.   Distribution of responses to ”Do you feel 
BFT allows for greater autonomy in decision making at 
the tactical level?” where “N” indicates the number of 
respondents in each category. 
When accounting for operation (OEF/OIF) referenced in 
the survey, we found a significant difference at the .05 
level of significance between OEF and OIF focused 
respondents’ opinions. Where OIF focused respondents were 
almost evenly matched in their opinions, 71% of OEF focused 
respondents feel the BFT did not enable greater decision 
making at the tactical level compared to 29% who did. Figure 




Figure 27.   The graph of “Do you feel BFT allows for 
greater autonomy in decision making at the tactical 
level?” as analyzed by the country of focus for this 
survey. 
 These results were surprising as the BFT system is 
homogenous between theaters. Further analysis revealed that 
the majority of OEF focused respondents who claimed that BFT 
did not allow for greater autonomy at the tactical level are 
aviators. Therefore, we factored in whether or not the 
response originated from an aviator or ground based 
respondent. This further categorization decreased from 69 to 
66 (15 Aviator/51 Ground) the number of eligible responses 
to this question; however, when accounting for an Aviator or 
Ground MOS, we found a statistically significant difference 
at the .05 statistical level between responses. Officers 
with ground MOSs are almost evenly split with roughly half 
stating “Yes” and about a third stating “No” with the 
remainder choosing “Depends.” Conversely, almost 87% of 
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Aviators believe that the BFT does not allow for greater 
autonomy at the tactical level. Results are shown in Figure 
[28]. 
 
Figure 28.   The graph of “Do you feel BFT allows for 
greater autonomy in decision making at the tactical 
level?” as analyzed by Aviator and Ground 
categorization.  
Supporting Vignettes  
-“I do not. In fact, at the tactical level you tend to be 
more micro managed and second guessed by higher headquarters 
largely because an icon on the screen doesn't always tell 
you what is going on therefore they tend to want more 
information.” (Maj, OEF, 2009) 
-“No. It creates conditions where leaders monitoring the 
various nets are able to second guess and "armchair 
quarterback" your decisions, as it is employed. I think it 
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offers the potential for greater autonomy, but many leaders 
use it as a micromanagement tool.” (Capt, OEF, 2009) 
 -“No. There are several advantages associated with the BFT, 
however in my opinion the best opportunities for decision 
making are with the commander on-site. In some cases the BFT 
could contribute to confusion if a higher level of command 
is viewing a situation based on a screen capture and 
subordinate leaders have a different perspective on the 
ground.”  
Dissenting Vignettes 
-“It does. It gives the tactical unit leader a common 
operating picture of friendly unit positions and potential 
danger areas (IEDs, etc) and other graphical information 
that aids in battlespace awareness. With this awareness, the 
leader can make better decisions at his/her level.” (Maj, 
OIF, 2008) 
-“Yes, it could because of increased situational awareness 
so that commanders at lower levels are able to make 
decisions without having to go through HHQ to get the 
information.” (1stLt, OIF, 2006) 
Inconclusive Vignettes  
-“Yes and no; greatly depending on the Commander. I often 
found the BFT created a data hungry environment, where 
answers were expected immediately as a tactical situation 
was unfolding. There needs to be considerable thought put in 
place as to 'how' to communicate effectively with the BFT. 
Point and click messaging doesn't mean instant understanding 
of the situation.” (Capt, OIF, 2007) 
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-“Situationally dependent. A leader that doesn't exercise 
mission C2 is not going to regardless of the technology 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The evidence is inconclusive as to FBCB2-BFT’s 
influence on C2 and decision making in an operational 
environment at the tactical level (Marine Corps battalion 
and below). Analysis of the survey respondents’ before and 
after answers does not demonstrate any statistically 
significant difference in how C2 and decision making occur 
with and without FBCB2-BFT. This is surprising given the 
amount of literature and OIF after action reports testifying 
to the system’s transformational impact on these two areas. 
Although respondents noted an increased use of the system in 
combat, they did not articulate a change in the amount of 
information exchanged with their immediate HQ or in the 
amount of orders received from a HQ higher than their own. 
While the means with which this information was exchanged 
shifted during combat (increased use of FBCB2-BFT, decreased 
use of radio), the frequency of these exchanges remained 
relatively constant indicating the system has little effect 
on the C2 style of the commander. This is reinforced by the 
lack of a statistically significant difference in the 
respondents’ ratings of their immediate commander’s use of 
mission C2 between training and combat.  This, too, is 
surprising given the commander’s ability to exploit the SA 
and communications aspects of FBCB2-BFT and bypass 
subordinate leaders. However, these findings are not 
universal throughout the sample as will be discussed below. 
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 The impact of FBCB2-BFT on decision rights is 
interesting in that very few (11%) of the respondents feel 
the system facilitates a shift of decision-making 
responsibilities to junior leaders. This is in contrast to 
37% who feel that decision rights have actually shifted to 
senior leaders and over half (52%) who feel that the system 
has no effect on decision rights. The small proportion of 
officers who believe the BFT has shifted decision rights to 
junior leaders would indicate that most officers do not feel 
the system improves decentralized decision making. However, 
the majority (82%) belief that traditional hierarchies 
should remain in place would indicate that the Marine Corps 
should continue to operate within the hierarchical decision-
making model even though FBCB2-BFT is not empowering the 
junior leader.  
 The effect of FBCB2-BFT on autonomy follows a similar 
pattern. The almost even split between those respondents who 
feel the system allows for greater autonomy (44%) and those 
who do not (46%), with 11% stating that it depends, was 
surprising. Given the small number of respondents who feel 
that decision rights have shifted to junior leaders, it was 
expected that a similar proportion of officers would feel 
the system allows for greater autonomy.  
 However, by analyzing these findings by whether or not 
the respondent was an aviator, there is a statistically 
significant difference in both categories. These findings 
help generate and evaluate the alternative hypothesis (Ha): 
There is a significant difference between how aviators and 
ground based MOSs use the BFT. 
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 The results support the alternative hypothesis that 
there are significant differences between how aviators and 
ground based MOSs use the BFT. Environmental variables not 
addressed in the survey may affect or account for this 
difference. For instance, it is possible that many of the 
respondents were members of the same unit and shared the 
same commander. Additionally, organizational and cultural 
factors uniquely associated with the aviation community have 
not been addressed. While this thesis focused on the 
tactical level, specifically battalion and below, it does 
not delineate between flying squadrons and ground 
battalions. Both exist at the O-5 command level, however, 
few would argue that they are identical in their command 
climate, culture and organizational structure.   
Other limitations of the convenience sample preclude 
generalization to the entire Marine Corps and particularly 
to enlisted Marines. Additionally, it should be noted that 
the combat experiences of the respondents took place 
disproportionally during counter-insurgency operations. This 
distinction is important as other research has focused on 
the use of FBCB2 and FBCB2-BFT during the “combat” phase of 
OIF and have come to significant conclusions about the 
efficacy of the system.6 
                     
6 For a comprehensive analysis see, “A Network Centric Operations 
Case Study: US/UK Coalition Combat Operations during Operation Iraqi 
Freedom” Evidence Based Research, Inc. 2004. 
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B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Additional Research into the Differences Between 
Ground and Aviation MOSs 
The statistically significant findings between aviator 
and ground officers’ use of the system provides a foundation 
for future research. Controlling for such factors as 
mission, platform, experience, etc., may help explain why 
this difference exists. These findings could help determine 
future variants of the system (for instance, fixed wing or 
rotary wing versions of the system) and fielding quotas.  
2. Expand the Sample to Include Enlisted Marines 
Limiting our research to a convenience sample or 
officers precluded the inclusion of enlisted Marines in our 
data. At approximately 90% of the total Marine Corps 
population (U.S. Marine Corps, 2009), capturing this 
demographic is critical in understanding FBCB2-BFT’s impact 
on the entire chain of command.  
3. Analyze FBCB2-BFT Use Across the Spectrum of 
Conflict 
While C2 and decision making are ubiquitous across the 
spectrum of conflict, the way information systems are used 
may differ depending on the type of operation. As previously 
discussed, FBCB2-BFT allows for increased operational tempo 
during high intensity conflict; however, how do commanders 
exploit its capabilities during more permissive operations 
such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief? 
Findings from this analysis can provide a more nuanced view 
of the system and help determine which capabilities should 
be included in future versions.  
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